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STATEMENT Q£ IHE ISSUES

EfllMI 1- JMFIgOICTIQN QF IHE. STATE TAX COMMISSI ON
CI) Does UCA S3-14A, The Individual Income Tax Act
of 1373, create a ''direct tax** which can be levied
on persons and property because of their
existence, or does it create an " indirect excise
tax" which is only levied on priviledged activitu?
CS) When enforcing the income tax, does the State
Tax Commission have Jurisdiction over
"nontaxpayers", those not involved in priviledged
activity; or are they restricted to "taxpayers",
persons involved in activities or event which are
taxable for revenue purposes?
C3) When Jurisdiction is challenged on an "income
tax" issue, must the State Tax Commission prove
that the dependent was involved in some
'activity', 'event', 'occasion', or 'incident'
which is taxable under the provisions of UCA
59-14A in order to obtain proper jurisdiction?
EQML JUL- UALIDITY QF Hi£ SUBPOENA
C D Does UCA 53-5-46(173 auortharize State Tax
Commission special agents to issue subpoenas for
witnesses, or does it restrict that power to the
Commission only?
(23 When UCA 53-5-46(173 grants the Commission
Power to subpoena "witnesses", does said term
encompass persons who are the object of, or the
putative defendent in the investigation?
(33 Does the State Tax Commission pursuant to UCA
59-5-46(173 have more extensive subpoena powers
than are granted to Judicial proceedings, or are
they restricted by the same safeguards as are the
courts?

ffilfii ILL- JURISDICTION QF jug. J&&

COURT

C D Does UCA 59HB4-1, which creates the Tax Court
Division of the Judicial Districts, grant general
Jurisdiction, or only ''exclusive" jurisdiction of
all appeals from and petitions for review of
decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered
after formal hearings before the Commission", to
the Tax Court?
CE?) When a District Court Judge sits as the
District's "Tax Court Judge", is he limited to the
jurisdictional scope of the "Tax Court" ?
C3) Can the Tax Court, created by UCA 5S-£li-l,
assume jurisdiction over a case before the State
Tax Commission has conducted "formal hearings",
and "rendered" any decisions pursuant to the
evidence presented at said "formal hearings"?

ILL
STftTLlTQRY FRQUISIONS

Chapter 5: State Tax Commission
Section 46:General Powers and Duties
Subsection (17):
(17) to examine all records, books, papers, and
documents relating to the valuation of property of
any corporation or individual, and to subpoena
witnesses to appear and give testimony and to
produce records,books, papers, and documents
relating to any matter which the commission has
authority to investigate or determine. The
commission or any party may in any investigation
cause depositions of witnesses to be taken as in
civil actions. Any member of the State Tax
Commission, its secretary, and such other officers
or employees as the commission may designate, may
administer oaths and affirmations in any matter or
proceeding relating to the exercise of the powers
and duties of the commission;
Chapter 14A: Individual Income Tax Act of 1973
Section 2: Declaration of intent.
The intent of the legislature in the enactment
of this act, is to accomplish the following
objective:
(a) To impose on each resident individual,
estate or trust for each taxable year a tax
measured by the amount of his "taxable income: for
such year, as determined for federal income tax
purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and

(d) To conform to the extent practicable,
certain of the existing rules of procedure under
and for the administration of the Utah individual
income tax law to corresponding or apposite rules
of administration and procedure prescribed by the
federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction
of duplication of effort, promotion of better
understanding of requirements, and greater
consistency between state and federal procedure
and administration.

Section 4: Definitions.
Cc)The term "taxpayer" means any individual,
estate, or trust or beneficiary thereof, whose
Income is subject in whole or part to the tax
imposed by this act.
Section 11: State taxable income of resident
individual.
The term $*state taxable income" in the case of a
resident individual means his federal taxable
income with the modifications, subtractions and
adjustments provided in section 59-14A-13. For
definition of state taxable income of a resident
estate or trust, see sectionS9-14A~B7.
Section 8.1: Taxable years,
Ca) For purposes of the tax imposed by this act,
a taxpayer's taxable year shall be the same as his
taxable year for federal income tax purposes.

Title 5S, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act.
Section 1:
CI) There is created a tax division in each of
the district courts of the state of Utah which
shall have exclusive Jurisdiction of all appeals
from and petitions for review of decisions by the
state tax commission rendered after formal
hearings before the commission.

UieU Etthm QL ELliilL

PROCEDURE

Rule 45. Subpoena
Section Cd3: Subpoena for Taking Deposition; Place
of examination.
C2) A resident of the state may be required to
attend an examination only in the county wherein
he resides or is employed or transacts his
business in person, or at such other convenient
place as is fixed by an order of the court. A
nonresident of the state may be required to attend
only in the county in this state wherein he is
served with a subpoena, or within 40 miles from
the place of service, or at such other convenient

place as is fixed by an order of the court.
U M U M STATES CJQUEL

TITLE E6
Section 1313
Cb) Notwithstanding section 7701CaK143, the term
taxpayer means any person subject to a tax under
the applicable revenue laws.

LU1IIE3I SI&IE& CONSTITUTION
Sixteenth Amendment
The congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.

in
Siai£0££il Q£ XH£CaS£L

NBIUES, Q£ UtLE. CaS£
This is a civil case, brought by the State Tax
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SIC) as an
origional action in the Tax Court based on the alLegations
that Appellant, Mr. Iverson, is a taxpayer uiithin the
jurisdictional relm of the STC, is liable for an income tax
for the years 1983-1984, has a duty to obey an administrative
subpoena, pursuant to UCft 59-5-46(17 3, seeking information
concerning assets with which to satisfy said alledged
liability and the collection thereof, and has not fulfilled
said duty for which sanction of a 30 day jail sentence was
imposed pursuant to a contempt ruling by the Tax Court Judge
of the Third Judicial District.
fir, Iverson timely denied all of said allegations,
specifically declaring that h^ is not a taxpayer, thereby
challenging the jurisdiction of both the STC and the Tax
Courtf and has consistently demanded all of his inalienable
rights as guaranteed in the organic laws of the United
States. In addition he challenged the validity and accuracy
of the Notice of Deficiency upon which the alindge tax
liability uias based and pursuant to wnich the administrative

subpoena was issued. The validity of the subpoena itself was
challenged as being improperly issued and therefore void.

COURSEflLIHL FTOCEEPINgg

The course c:f these proceedings technically begin at the
administrative level on August 14, 1985 when the STC served a
'Notice of Deficiency' for the years 1383-1984, on Mr.
Iverson claiming an income tax liability with iterest, and
penalties due. Mr. Iverson responded by contesting the
Jurisdiction of the STC explaining that he is not a taxpayer
and as such was not liable for any tax, and could not avail
himself of procedures established for taxpayers only, such as
filing Petitions for Redetermination. He did however demand a
'Prior Hearing* and after some hesitation on the part of the
STC Compliance Officer, a 'meeting* mas scheduled for
September SO, 1985. Said 'meeting' mas subsequently canceled
with the explanation that "...you CMr.Iverson) have had ample
opportunity to ask questions... there is no more for us to
discuss." The STC continued foretuard with their proceedure as
if Mr. Iverson were a taxpayerf finalizing their audit
deficiency, recording warrents at the county recorder's
office, and moving into collection; all without holding any
prior, formal, informal or other type of public hearing to
take evidence and determine if fir. Iverson was indeed a

taxpayer.
A Subpoena Duces Tecum was issued by the Commissioners
on March El, 19BB commanding Mr, Iverson to appear on 10
April, 1986 at the private offices of the STC in Salt Lake
City, to be deposed and produce records. This Subpoena was
not delivered to Mr. Iverson until after the date set certain
for the deposition; he was therefore unable to attend.
An STC Compliance Officer, realizing her error in
service, altered the First subpoena, and had the altered
document personally served on Mr. Iverson in Garrison Utah.
Mr. Iverson, recognizing this second document as an
unauthorized alteration; and still challenging STC
jurisdiction inFormed the commission by mail that he would
not be in attendance* At this point the STC commenced
judicial proceedings by filing an origional civil action with
the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District. Said action was
commenced with a UERIFIED PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE,
which was granted.
Mr. Iverson was served in Garrison, Utah with the ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE, commanding his appearance on may 19,1986
before the above-mentioned court; which he did. Rather than
being given opportunity to 'show cause' why he had not obeyed
the purported subpoena, Mr. Iverson was coerced onto the
witness stand to supply the evidence the STC wanted to
convict him. Mr. Iverson objected strongly, but took the
stand, after threats of contempt, and was questioned.

Following the questioning and some discussion and
argumentation, the Judge found fir, Iverson m

contempt, and

imposed a sanction of a 30 day Jail sentence , commitment
forthwith, fir. Iverson was denied any opportunity to perge
himself before incarceration, but was taken immediately to
the Salt Lake County Jail. After 11 days in Jail. fir. Iverson
was able to file the Notice of Appeal and other papers to
initiate this appeal and secure his release pending its
ajudication.

SIftTEPENI QL IHE. E££JS

1* rir. Iverson 9s status is that of a simple individual, as in
free from complications and combinations, a free and natural
person.

2. Mr. Iverson is not the recipient of any special grant from
the state; he is not a priviledged person such as a firm,
partnership, association, corporation, franchise, etc.

3. fir* Iverson is not a taxpayer, but is a nontaxpayer, and
does not engage m

any revenue taxable activities. His

activities are intentionally limited to the exercise of
inalienable rights, (record p. 69 11. 15&1B)

4. On August 14, 1985 , the State Tax Commission served fir.
Iverson with a Notice of Deficiency for the years 1983-1984.
(record p, SO 1. 15, p. 61 11. 20~25)

5. Said Notice of Deficiency tuas based upon admittedly
fabricated figures. No W-2 or other documents proving
receipts of income during the years 1983 & 1984 have been
presented to fir. Iverson or the court by the STC. (record p.
61 11. 19-25)

6. fir. Iverson challenged the accuracy of the allegations and
figures both orally and through documents served and mailed
to the 5TC. (record p. 61)

7. Mr Iverson challenged the Jurisdiction of the STC to
proceed thusly against him; demanding that they provide
evidence of their jurisdiction and his being a taxpayer,
(record p. 60 11. 14-18)

8. The STC refused to hold a 'Formal' or 'Prior' hearing to
take evidence and determine if fir. Iverson was a taxpayer.
(Administrative record!)

9. On flarch 21, 1986 four Commissioners of the Utah State Tax
Commission signed and issued a SUBPOENA DUCES TECUfl
commanding Mr. Iverson "... To appear before a hearing
officer and/or commissioner(s) of the Utah State Tax
Commissionon on the 10th day of April, 1986 at Room 510 Heber
n. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah...", (record p. 59 11. EO-22)

10. Said SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM was mailed to Mr. Iverson on
April 10, 1986 by Certified nail No. 181679. (record p, 58 L
19)

11. fir. Iverson did not receive said subpoena until April 11,
1986, one day after the day set certain for deposition. For

this cause he did not appear as commanded on April 10, 1986.
(record p. SB 11. 18-23)

IE, On April S3, 1986 at 12:10 P.M. fir Iverson was served
with a purported SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM in Garrison Utah,
Millard County by a Special Agent of the STC. (record p. 11)

13. Said second subpoena was an exact copy of the origional
with the exception that the first page had been rewritten
(altered) to read that Mr. Iverson was commanded to appear on
May 5, 1988. The signature page on this second subpoena was
an exact copy of the signature page of the first subpoena,
(record p. 59 11. 17-22)

1H. Said second subpoena claimed to be issued pursuant to UCA
59~5~-li6(17) which grants the Commission power to:
"•..subpoena 'witnesses' to appear and give testimony and to
produce records, books, papers and documents relating to any
matter which the commission has authority to investigate or
determine..." (record p. 7) (Emphasis added)

15. Said second subpoena claimed to be seeking information
"... concerning your assets and/or assets which may or will
become available to you and which will satisfy in whole or in
part the Audit Deficiency entered against you...", (record p.
7)

IB. On April H9, 1S8B Mr. Iverson informed the STC, by mail,
that he would not be present at the meeting on May 5, 1SBS,
because of his belief that said second subpoena, which
commanded him to appear on that date, was invalid, that it
exceeded the scope of Jurisdiction of the STC, and that it
was issued under color of law , among other reasons. Crecord
p. 60 1. 3)

17. On nay B, 1986, the STC filed a UERIFIED PETITION FOR
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE with the Tax Court of the Third Judicial
District, and on that same day said Tax Court issued an ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE commanding fir. Iverson to appear on May IS, and
"...then and there to show cause, if any he may have, why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt and punished
accordingly for failure to obey the Suboena Duces Tecum
properly issued by the Utah State Tax Commission on the 21st
day of March, 1986.". Crecord pp. E-6, 15-16)

18. fir. Iverson was served with a copy of said UERIFIED
PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, and a copy of the ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE by an STC Special Agent, on May IE in Garrison,
Millard County, Utah. Crecord p. IS)

19. This case came before the Tax Court as an origional
action filed by the STC. Crecord p. 46 11. lS-El)

20. This case did not come before the Tax Court as an appeal,

and no appeal or petition for review of an STC decisions has
be made to the Tax Court by an aggrieved taxpayer concerning
these issues, (record p. 46 11. 3-5)

21. On May 19, 1S8B fir. Iverson appeared specially before
Judge Rigtrup in the Third District Tax Court to challenge
the jurisdiction of said court to hear this case, and the
jurisdiction of the STC to investigate this case, (record p.
44 11. 11-15)

22. Judge Rigtrup summarily overuled this objection to
jurisdiction and refused to allow fir. Iverson to present
evidence or argument in support of said challenge, (record p.
52 11. 1-16)

23. Judge Rigtrup also denied fir. iverson 'counsel of his
choice', even though the hearing threatened, and in fact did
result in, fir. Iverson*s imprisonment, (record pp. 47-48)

24. By threatening contempt, Mr, Iverson was coerced to take
the witness stand and be questioned by STC counsel, over his
objection to being a witness against himself, (record p. 49
11. 4~13)

25. fir, Iverson was found in contempt by Judge Rigtrup and
committed forthwith from the courtroom to the Salt Lake
County Jail for thirty days, (record p. 73 11. 10-12)

£6, fir. Iverson was not allowed an opportunity to purge
himself of the contempt ruling before being whisked to Jail,
despite his objections to such action. Crecord p. 74 11.
14-2H)

27. The NOTICE OF APPEAL initiating this Appeal was filed by
fir. Iverson, while still in Jail, on flay 29, 19BB. Crecord p.
24, pp. 29-30)

SUntiARY QL GBSUnmiSL

POINT 1 Appellant argues that he is not a 'taxpayer*,
therefore, is not within the system of revenue laws and
cannot be held liable for any performance they demand.

POINT 11

Appellant argues that the administrative subpoena

for which he was held in contempt; was issued by unauthorized
persons, was directed to a person outside the statutory scope
of UCA 59-5-46(17), and demanded that he appear for
deposition outside his County contrary to URCP 45dC2). For
these reasons it was invalid, having no force or power.

POINT III

Appellant argues that the Tax Court of the Third

Judicial District is excluded by statute CUCA 59-24-1) from
hearing instant case.

u
fiFSUtiENTS

EQIWII

JURISDICIlQIi QE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION

IMffiXEB. bi NONTftXPftYER
On numerous occasions during the proceedings of this
case, both at the administrative level and at the Judicial
hearing, I have challenged the Jurisdiction of the State Tax
Commission Crecord p. 61 11. 10-13D; explaining that I am not
a taxpayer and that the revenue laws are therefore not
binding upon me. Both the STC and the Tax Court Judge have
essentially ignored this claim as frivilous. No attempt has
been made to prove that I am a taxpayer because they seem to
have assumed that since I am alive and fairly well clothed
and fed, I must of necessity be a taxpayer. This is of course
an erroneous assumption, because it requires more than just
being alive, fed and clothed to become a taxpayer. I suspect
that the STC itself doesnst understand what it is that makes
one a taxpayer. It therefore appears that in ordBr to
maintain my defence, I must prove what makes a taxpayer and
that I am not one; even though the burden of proof justly
rests upon the STC, the accusers.

Many of the citations and references used in the
briefing of this point are of cases where the federal income
tax laws were at issue. Such citations are still relevant to
the case at hand since the Utah State Tax Commission has
essentially adopted the Internal Revenue Code by statute in
UCA 59-14A.
For any competent attorney to properly understand this
jurisdictional objection, he must become thoroughly familiar
with the U.S. Supreme Court rulings concerning income
taxation and revenue laws, As recently as 1972, they ruled:

"The revenue laws are a code or system in
regulation of tax assessment and collection. Theu
H P W P iSL taxpayers s M oat to nontaxpauers, the
latter are without their scope. No, procedure is
prescribed for nontaxpauers. and no attempt is
made to annul any of their rights and remedies in
due course of law."
Long v. Rasmuseen. 281 F. 236, at 238. (1922);
^pqnpmy EJLymfaJLIlBL and Heating v^. U.S. .470 F. 2d
585, at 589. (1972) (Emphasis added)

Obviously this issue resolves itself down to a matter of
definition, which the U.5» Supreme Court also recognized and
declared in the Sheafer v^ Carter case in 1920 CSheafer v^
Carter 252 U.S. 37, at p. 553 Who then is a Taxpayer and who
is a nontaxpayer is the ail important definition to be
resolved here. UCA 59~-14A-4(c) defines a taxpayer as:
(c) The term "taxpayer" means any individual,
estate, or trust or beneficiary thereof, whose
income jjj, subject in whole or part to the tax
imposed by this act. UCft 59~14ft~4(c) (Emphasis
added)

this pivotal term is further defined in the Internal Revenue
Code at sections 1313(b).
Cb) Notwithstanding section 7701(a)(14), the
term "taxpayer" means any person subject to a tax
under the applicable revenue laws.
2& U.5.C. 1313(b) (Emphasis added)
From these references it is clear that the term "taxpayer"
applies only to those persons who are sub lect to a tax under
the applicable revenue law.
In order to determine who is subject to the "income
tax", the nature of that tax must be analyzed. Let us begin
with the U.S. Constitution which speaks of two general
classes of taxes that may be imposed: direct and indirect.
Uery specific and precise instuctions on the application of
each is also given. The U.S. Supreme Court comments thusly on
these two classes:
"In the matter of taxation, the Constitution
recognizes the two great classes of direct and
indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which
their imposition must be governed, namely: the
rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the
rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and
excises."
R P U P G K v^ Farmens' Loan & Trust Co. , 157 U.S.
429, at 557 (1B95);
B f M g W g r iL^ Union Pacific R.R. Co.f 240 U.S. 1,
at 13. (1916) (Emphasis added)

It is said that the income tax is pursuant to the
Sixteenth Amendment of our U.S. Constitution, which states:

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states,
and without regard to any census or enumeration."
Sixteenth Amendment. (19133 .•
..

Since the only class of tax that can be .laid en incomes
without apportionment among the several states, and without
regard to any census ur enumeration, is an iiiillrjiet. tax; ue
can see that the 'without apportionment' language of this
amendment confines the "'income tax" to the class of indirect:
taxes only* For example, in v.he cas^s uf ElliialliifeSL v,„;„ UHlSll
Facifi c gjJL., 240 U.S. lt and Stanton y_L, Baltic, Mining Co^,
240 U.S. 103, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixteenth
Amendment, and the Income tax act passed un"!';r it, are
constitutional because they only concern indirect tax esf

end

because the Amendment iotas not authorize tho Ll,,.:r,,,.ci.c.t L^J^Cikll
of incomes or even confer any new power of taxation, nor decs
i t i 11 any <uaij a 11er , change , «?n 1 arge or af i ect the tax ing
power origionally conferred upon Congress by Article 1,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution,
,J

'(T)he contention that the amendment treats a tax
on income as a direct tax ... is ..* wholly
n
without foundation
gru?h§ber ^u. union Pacifi c, R^JR^ iiy.„, mo u.s. I,

at page 18, C19161 (Emphasis added J
"CT)he Sixteenth Amendment conferred NO NEW POWER
OF TAXATION but simply prohibited the previous
complete and plenary power of income taxation
posessed by Congress from the beginning from heinj
taken out of the category of indirect taxation to
which it inherantly belonged..,."

Stantan v^„ Baltic runing Co.. 240 u.s. 103, at
page 115. C1316 3 (Emphasis added)

"CT)he conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did
not in any degree involve holding that income
taxes generically and necessarily came within the
class of direct taxes on property, but on the
contraru recognized the FACT that taxation on
income was in its nature an excise entitled to be
enforced as such.,.."
BfUghaber, supra, at pages 16-17. (Emphasis added)

Because the income tax is by its nature an excise tax,
it cannot actually be assessed on income as property, but
rather is assessed on revenue taxable events, incidents or
activities, from which the income is merely used for
measuring the tax. Hence, the name "income tax". It is
aSgaEtilDtt to the income and not upon the income itself. The
class of taxes which are indirect includB imposts, duties,
and excises, and such taxes are never upon any kind of
property, but only upon revenue taxable activities, which
include, but are not limited to , the exercise of certain
procured priviledges, such as doing business in a corporate
capacity, where the measure of activity is typically income,
sales, inventory.etc.
In 191S, when th U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of the Sixteenth Amendment and the nature
of an income tax, the court relied on an earlier ruling made
in 1911 in the case of Flint v^ Stone Tracu Qs^,220 U.S. 107.
The court held in said case, that a tax measured by the
income of corporations or insurance companies is not a tax
directly on income as property, but an indirect, or excise,
tax upon the business activity of corporations which are

lawfuJ subjects nf* trrntion,
"Within the category ot indirect taxalun, as we
shall have further occasion to show, is embraced a
tax upon business done ir * corporate capacity..."

runt £* atons. icacii CQ^, rvo u.s. t07, at iso
C1911)
»ye mu st remember, too, that the revenues ol the
United States must be obtained in the same
territory, from the same people, and excise taxes
must be collected from the same activities as are
also reached by the states in order to support
their local governments*"
Flint, SUiiLi, at 154 . * Emphasis added >
"Conceding th© power of Congress to id,, the
business activities of private corporations ,.
the tax must be measured by some standard... "
"It is therefore well settled by l he decisions nf
this court that mhBn the soverign authority has
exercised the right to tax a legitimate subjert of
taxation as an exercise of a franchise or
pnviledge, it is no objection that the measure* ut
taxation is found in the income...."
Flint, suora. at 1B5. CEmphasis added)

From this ruling UB r-*n see that the activities of a
corporation fire indeed legitimate subjects of taxation, but
u»hat activities; aro pat; Ipgitimate suhjocts ot taxation'"'1
Again the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled:
W

A state may not impose a charge for thn enjoyment
of a right guaranteed Ly the i oderaJ
Constitution."

HurqgffK SLS. Pgnnuslyyua, 3ia u.s. IOU, at H D .
C1943)

Th3 f e d e r a l

gov u"iiT^Jiit a? r* I na s t a i n

c a n n o t , aTlJL t h e r e f o r e £n y\ t n±

UUVCL

taxed the t r e e

c o n s t i t u t ituiH 1 ly s e c u r e d r i r j h t s .

"irrnnts

L^BFJISB

Nn e x a m p l e of a

t h e n i s one u^ho i s e n g a g e d i n a r e v e n u e t a x a b l e

uf

' LaApayec *
activity,

while an example of a 'nantaxpayer' is one whose activities
are merely the exercise of inalienable, Constitutionally
guaranteed rights. One who lawfully contracts his own labor
to engage in innocent and harmless activities in exchange for
lawful compensation cannot be taxed for revenue purposes ,
and is therefore not a 'taxpayer' as defined by statute, but
is a 'nontaxpayer' and is entitled to all the fruits of his
labors.

"The right to labor and to its protection from
unlawful interference is a constitutional as well
as a common-law right. Every man has a natural
right to the fruits of his own industry."
ifi BSSL Jur 2d. Section 2, Page BO.

An indirect tax , as the 'income tax' has been ruled to
be, is never a tax upon the tangible fruit, but rather upon
the taxable event or activity.

"A tax laid upon the happening of an event, as
distinguished from its tangible fruits, is an

Indirect £&&. •.."
Tuler v. U.S.. 281 U.S. 437, at 502 C1S30)
(Emphasis added)

Knowing that the so-called 'income tax' is in fact an
indirect tax and in its nature an excise tax, it follows that
said excise tax cannot be, and therefore has not been,
imposed upon an individual in his exercise of a natural right
secured by the U.S. Constitution, one of said rights being

the right of existance. The Oregon Supreme Court has so
stated:

"The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot; be
taxed for the mere priviledge of existing, This
corporation is an artificial entity which owes its
existence and charter powers to the state; but the
individuals' rights to live and own property are
natural rights, for the enjoyment of which an
BXfiASB BflPnqt fa& ifflBflaSd.."
Kffflftqld ^ UshSJL, 232 P. 8 1 3 . a t 6 1 3 , C1930)
CEmphasis added)

Here we come to the heart of this argument; to prove
that I am a taxpayer, the STC must show that I have been
engaged in a revenue taxable activity,, event, or enterprise,
as compared to merely exercisino Constitutionally guaranteed
rights. The mere Fact that '! '. . . I ' m alive, because I haven't
died Fram ! \unger, havei t' t starved to death, becai ise I have
clothes and conclude from that that I must be a taxpayer...."
(record p. SB ) is not proof of being a taxpayee subject to
UCA Title 59-14A the Individual Income Tax Act, If they have
nat, and c annot p r eve t ha t I am a t a x p a y er a11 t h eir a 11 e mpt s
to a pp.] y "

the code or system in regulation of tax

collection. " are null and without effect because sai d code or
system "... relate to taxpayers and not to nontaxpayers, The
latter are without their scope,,.*" '.quotations from Economy
ElumfalDfl. S M Heating v^ U. S, , 470 f .Ed 585, at 589 3,
Furthermore, any a11empts to coerce me i nto f o11 oining
procedures prescribed for taxpayers, such as the Filing of

Petitions for Redetermination, is of no use because I, being
a nontaxpayer, can receive no benefit from such procedure:

"Persons who are not taxpayers are not within the
system and can obtain no benefit by following the
procedure prescribed for taxpayers...."
Economy >gjJB£gL, at page 590.

Absent proof that I am a taxpayer subject to the revenue
laws, the STC has no standing to issue Notices of Deficiency
or obtain warrents against me or mine. They have no authority
to investigate or determine any matter concerning me or mine;
therefore any subpoena issued pursuant to UCA 59-5-46C17} in
this case is misapplied and in error, having no power. The
Judgement of contempt for not obeying such a subpoena and the
imposition of a Jail sentence as sanctions is clearly
unlawful and ought to be reversed and dismissed respectively.

PPINI II IHE. PPniNISIBftTWE SUBFQENA ai ISSUE

UAS INUALID

If the circumstances of this case were different and I
had indeed been involved in a revenue taxable activity,
thereby being a taxpayer; the contempt ruling would still be
in error because the administrative subpoena involved was
improperly issued. It is my contention that said

administrative subpoena commanding me to "... appear'before a
hearing officer and/or commissionerCs) of the Utah State Tax
Commissio n on the 5th day o f n a y , 19 8 6 a t r o a in 5 1 0 , H e h e i: • fl.
U e i l s building, 1H0 Last 3 0 0 South, Salt I ake City, Utah
8 4 1 3 4 at 10:00 a.m., then ai id there to give testimony and b e
deposed.,,"

'.record p. />, w a s and is an invalid

subpoena

because of the folioumny reasons*.
First, that said, subpoena uaa not

in

fact issued by the

S t a t e Tax Commission., but was concocked by a

'compliance

o f f i c e r' a nd i s the re fore a fra tj d. In su pp o rt of 11 \ is
contention ! point out that on April 11, 1986 ! received a
certified letter #161579, from, the STC containing a SUBPOENA
DLICES TECUH comma.nding me ta appear o? I the 101i I of April,
1986'. Page 4 of th i s doci jment was dated f 1 arch 21, 198B, and
s i gned by the Utah State Iax Commission: M ark K* Buch i ? Joe
B * P ache c o, R ,, H . H a n s e n , a r 1 d R o g e r 0 . I e w . N a t u r a 11 y I c o u 1 d
not appear a s commanded because the time and date set certain
had already passed before I w a s notified trecord p. 5 8
11 , 18-23).
1 became suspicious when on April 23, 1386, I was served
with another document, purporting to be a subpoena from the
Stata Tax Commission, cormia^dJ ng rnw tn appear o? \ a di ffei ent
date, but the signature pnge was identical to that of tl iti
first document (record p, SS 11. 1-4) . It m a s quite appai ant
that the second document w a s a forgery since the
c o m m i s s i o n e r s would not reasonably sign tup s u b p o e n a s on the

same day, to the same person, for the same reason, but
commanding him to appear on different dates almost a month
apart, and then have them delivered on such divergent days.
During the hearing on May 19, 1986, I challenged the validity
of the second document purported to be a subpoen which
commanded appearance on flay 5, 1386, because of this very
point. The STC presented no evidence, nor even any argument
supporting the validity of that purported subpoena. Mr.
Miller, counsel for the STC, admitted that there were two
documents involved, but did not want to talk about the first
document (record p. 59 11. 10-163. Obviously it is improper
to find a person in contempt and imprison him for not obeying
a forged, and therefore invalid subpoena!
The second point supporting the invalid subpoena
argument is that while the power to subpoena is available to
the commissioners of the STC under UCA 59-5-46(17), I as a
putative defendant in such a proceeding am not a 'witness*
within the meaning of that subsection, therefore the STC is
without power to subpoena me pursuant to it. This contention
is fully supported by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. (linker. 350 U.S. 173 (Addendum #1), which is
a case where a naturalized citizen was administratively
subpoened as a 'witness* in an investigation maintained for
the purpose of determining whether denaturalization
proceedings should be instituted against him. The court held
that he was a putative defendant in such proceedings and was
not a 'witness* within the statute conferring subpoena power

upon immigration officers.
The para] iels between the fiinker case and the one at
hand are striking with only slight differences which are
ultimately immaterial to the issues* Both concern a citizen
ui h o i s u n d e r t h e p r o t a c t i v e g t J a r a n t e e s c F t h e o r g a n i c 1 a a J s o f

the United states* Both concern a situation where that
citizen is under investigation by an administrative agency of
g o v s r n m e n t . B o t h artm i n i s t r a 11 v e a g e n c i e s c 1 a i rn s u b p o e n a

powers pursuant to a specific sf: acute. Both statutes relied
upon, grant the agency power to subpoena 'witnesses , uaing
that very term UJCft 53-55-46(17), addendum ttl p.883), The U.S.
Supreme Court concludes its cpinion in said fiinker case by
stating:

"A11 11 iac3 consideraticnB converge
to the
conclusion chat Congress has not provided with
sufficient clarity that the subppena power granted
by (sec. )E?3SCa) extends over persons who are the
subject of denaturalization investigations;
therefor& Congress is not to be deemed to have
done so impliedly."
UDliLSJSi StSLfcSS. X. Ilinker 350 U.S. 173 at ISO
CAddendum #1)

Mr. Justice Frankferter delivered the opinion of the
Court, hut Mr* Justice Black felt so strongly on some of
these issues that he delivered his own concurring opinion, in
which he expressed the issues and concerns so appropriately
that I must pass on his exact words;

"The respondent Minker is a naturalized citizen

of the United States. He was subpoened by an
immigration officer to appear and give testimony
as a 'witness.* But Ninker was not to be a witness
within the traditional meaning of that word, that
is, one who testifies in a court proceeding or in
a public quasi-Judicial hearing of some kind,..
The object in summoning Minker was to interrogate
him in the immigration officer's private chambers
to try to elicit information "relating to the
possible institution
of proceedings seeking the
revocation of mmm CMinker'sI] naturalization. ***"
Information so obtained might be used under some
circumstances in court to take away (linker's
American citizenship or convict him of perjury or
some other crime. Thus the capacity m which this
immigration officer was acting was precisely the
same as that of a policeman, constable, sheriff,
or Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who
interrogates a person, perhaps himself a suspect,
in connection with murder or some other crime...
And we have frequently set aside state criminal
convictions as a denial of due process of law
because of coersive questioning of suspects by
public prosecutors and other law enforcement
officers in their official chambers... Yat power
of the Attorney General and immigration officers
to compel persons, including suspects, to appear
and subject themselves to questioning by law
enforcement officers in their private chambers is
precisely what the Department of Justice claims
here... The person summoned must go to an
immigration officer's private chambers for
questioning by him, out of which may come a
prosecution against the "witness" for perjury or
some other crime. A purpose to subject aliens,
much less citizens, to a police practice so
dangerous to individual liberty as this should not
be read into an Act of Congress in the absence of
a clear and unequivocal congressional mandate,..
rUnfrffr Suora at 190-196 (Addendum #13
"...It would have been surprising had
Congress attemped to authorize the Nation's chief
prosecuting officer and his subordinates to compel
a citizen to appear in government private offices
to answer questions about that citizen's conduct,
associations and beliefs. Some countries give such
powers to their officials. It is to be hoped that
this country never will."
ninker Supra at 195-196 (addendum #1)

It is equally as d e p l o r a b l e mhen states governme? tal
o f t i c i a i o a s s u m e sucn subpoena p o w e r s which r e s u l t , as in
t h i s cafie, in the unlawful iniprii.onrr.eTit of a citizen because
he d e m a n d s end s t a n l s ( irmly tor hts i nal if:,id!i l.e right
against self incrimination! ^ s is now clear, the proper
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 53' -5-4BC17) UCA granting
subpoena

the SIC pawar to

'witnesses' doss i lot extend to perso? iss sue! \ as

m y s e l f , who are p u t a t i v e d e f e n d a n t s in such p r o c e e d i n g s ,
T h e r e f o r e the subpoena in q u e s t i o n , which w a s thusly

issued,

i s nu1i a nd vo id, a n d a ny co nt e mpt r u1i ng s and s a n c t i o n s
imposed a r e , and were u n l a w f u l *

The th,t rd point, supporting the nival id subpoena argi tment
is that the document purported to be a suhno^n far e x c e e d s
the scope of authority of a proper supuena both in subject
mafctei and geoyrap) u c a l l y . Said subpoena s t a t e s that 1 am
", , , to give testimony ei id be deposed concerning your a s s e t s
and/or a s s e t s which may or will b e c o m e availahl e to yo* i which
will satisfy in whole or in part the Audit Deficiency

entered

a g a i n s t y o u , ., "(record p. 7 3 ; and yet of the ten q u e s t i o n s
asked, numbers 3,6,7

(

B, :3 0, and part of number 3 1 amd 4 ai: e

seeking e v i d e n c e of income for the y e a r s 1983 and 1SB4 rather
than a s s e t s which can satisfy the purported, Audit Deficiency.
T h e S T C it! o u I d 1 i k e t: o t u r n t h i s i n t o a w i d e o p e n
investigation

, a fishing e x p e d i t i o n

i* gou ^.^

.something upon which they can prosecute' mt*.

, ti, ru: n up

Furhtermore, said subpoena was served on me in Garrison,
Millard County, Utah, commanding me to appear at the offices
of the STC in SAlt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Such a
subpoena for deposition is in obvious violation of Rule
45dC2) URCP which provides:
(2) A resident of the state may be required to
attend an examination onlu in the county wherein
he resides or is employed or transacts his
business in person-.."
URCP 45d(53 (Emphasis added)

I do not reside, nor an I employed, nor do I transact
business in person in Salt Lake County; therefore I cannot be
required to attend a subpoena in that county. When confronted
with this argument during the hearing on May 19, 1986, fir.
Miller argued that "...it's irrelevant because the Tax
Commission is not operating pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure." (record p. 67 11. 1B-SQ3. Is Mr. Miller saying
that the STC has more sweeping and unrestricted authority
than the courts? Does the Tax Commission, an administrative
agency, have more subpoena power than the judicial courts of
the State of Utah? It appears at least that the Tax
Commission thinks it has, but such administrative procedure
is just not consistent with the safeguards which the
legislature has provided in the judicial process. For them to
infer that they have wider and more encompassing subpoena
power than a Judicial court is ridiculous, but not surprising
since the United States Supreme Court has warned us that the
subpoena power:

"...is a power capable of oppressive use,
especially when it may be indiscriminately
delegated and the subpoena is not returnable
before a Judicial officer."
UnltSd StStBS )L (linker 350 U.S. 17U at 1Q7.

The subpoena \n question i& a prime example of just such
'oppressive uvs' and is invalid bur; in^e it; far axceodf"

lliu

scope of a subpoena, properly issued consistent with
1egis1ativa safeguards.

POINT ill

JURISDICTION QL IHE. I M

COURT

At the very heyirniny nf the hi?n,"inr; on this coso, I
informed the court ibut 1 was appearing r3p^u;aily to
challenge the jurisdiction of the lax Court uf the Third
Judicial District (record p.44 11. ll-l~n.

By U.S. Supremo

Court deciciration "once jui'lsciicticn is challenged, it nu'it
be proven. "Cttaflfina y^J^^jji^, 4 15 LOS! b33, note 33

for

mere "pood Faith" assertions of power and authority have besn
abolished CQui^ns v. Indiana. 445 U.S. 6623 CEmphasiss added).
In response to this jurisdictional challenge, counsel
for t! ?e SIC argued that 1 JCA /£•'-..*\.J •• i1.: "'...gives the court
power to entertain such a matter an an order to show cause,
and that is the basis of the jurisdiction." (record p, 45
15-17 3. It is true that said statute gives fei court' such

K,

powers, but it specifically states that the court so
empowered is the district court, and makes no mention of the
Tax Court. It is my contention that while the district courts
are indeed courts of general jurisdiction created by the Utah
Constitution, and directed by title 78 UCft, the Judicial
Code; the Tax Court is not mentioned in the constitution but
is a legislative creation, authorized by UCA 53-24-1 which
states:

There is created a tax division in each of the distrit
courts of the State of Utah which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions for
review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered
after formal hearings before the commission. UCQ
59-54-1

I have read and analyzed this statute extensively and
contend that the intent of the legislature is best understood
through the very words of the act.

I have confidence that

our legislators are very proficient in the construction and
use of the English language, and that when they use the word
"exclusive", they intend it to convey the meaning as commonly
accepted*

Such common acceptance is properly verified by

consulting a well established dictionary such as Uebster's
New Twentieth Century Dictionary which defines "exclusive":
1. Excluding all others; shutting out other
considerations, happenings, existences, occupations,
etc.; as, vefiglsjaia and mineral are exclusive terms.
2. Having the tendency or power to exclude all others
3. Excluding all but what is specified; as, onlu is an
S^cJUiaiva particle.

4. Not shared or divided; sole; single; as, an exclusive
right to sell, something.
By this commonly accepted definition, the Tax Court is only
granted jurisdiction in a very precise and specific
circumstance, which is determined ny the occurrence of three
distinctly identifiable events, which are:? precisely outlined
in the statute, namely;
1. There must have been a decision rendered by the State
Tax Commission.
B. That decision must, have beer •^'-^sn;-?! §?£!•.££. fooi:X
hearings before the Commission*
3. fin appeal from or a petition for review of that
decisions so rendered, must be brought to the Tax Court.
If any of these indicia are missing then the issue does not
f a 11 uiithiTI

t: he 'ilfexc 1 usiv£3" J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Tax C o u r t

and

must he taken elswhere.
Since UOA 59-24-1 is the only jurisdictional grant to a
"Tax Court'* in all of the Utah Cods or the Utah State
Constitution, it must he the sole source of jurisdiction and
is evidence that the Tax Court is exclusively an appellate
court of the adm ini str a11 vF pror:odtJre of f; 1"'.e St af e Tax
Commission , created for the benefit and use of the aqqr i r.vad
taxpauerT who wishes to appeal a decision cf the STC . It was
never i nter,ded tc become t!ie pr J. v atc ei"«f :;> rcement arm of the
STC in which they bring all their grievances as origional
actions. This contention is supported by a ri 111? tg of this
Supreme Court in a recent case concerning proper ty taxation.

Said ruling in part reads:
"The statutory scheme establishing the tax
divisions...provides onlu that the tax division may
review decisions, determinations, and orders of the Tax
Commission, section 59-24-3 CSupp. 1983), and may
"affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order of the
state tax commission, and shall grant other relief,
invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in
accordance with its decision, as shall be appropriate."
Section 59-24-4 CSupp. 1983).
Kennecott v Salt Lake Countu. 23 UAR, p. 47 (Emphasis
added)

The STC argues that the general jurisdictional powers of
the district court spread over into the Tax Court. This
confusion may be because the Tax Court and its proceedings
are held in the district court facilities and are presided
over by a district court Judge. I contend that when a
district court Judge sits in the legislatively created Tax
Court, he is limited by the "Tax Court Act" C59-24 UCA) to
the position of an appellate court Judge, not the Judge of a
court of origional Jurisdiction like the district court.

The

Tax Court of any Judicial district is not the district court
of that Judicial district, nor is the district court the Tax
Court, but they are two distinct and seperate courts, each
with its own powers, grants, and scope of Jurisdiction. UCA
59-24-1 has no effect on the Jurisdiction or powers of the
district court, neither restricting them nor expanding them.
This statute simply created an intermediate forum between the
State Tax Commission and the Utah Supreme Court for hearing
appeals from and petitions for review of State Tax Commission
decisions rendered after formal hearings. The district

court's involvement is strictly for sta^finp and facilities,
and not for derivation of jurisdiction, If the I.rgi slature
heel intended, otherwise thay would not have created a
str.tutoiy Tax Court limited by such exclusive, jurisri ict i on
but would have simply used the existing district courts as
they were. The statute is very clear on this point and should
be strictly followed.
Perhaps a couplo of pertinent questions and their
answers will aid in seeing this distinction,

First, if the

Tax Court of the Third Judicial District; is simply a district
court judge to whom all tax reioteci issues are assigned, why
did it Lake a legislative act to create it?

M simple

categorizing of cases could have been accomplished by the
district count itself through its own case assignment
process. Tha answer to this question is clearly that: the
Legislature had more in mind than simply categorizing of
cases.
Secondly, before the p*rv.-.?.'.rjp raf The Tax Court Act (59-24
UCA) in 1977, what court had appelate jurisdiction over
"...appeals from and petitions for review of decisions by the
state tax commission...,,? Was it the District Courts? No *t
was nutf Before the passage of said Tax Lourt Act this, the
Supreme Court of the state, had such Jurisdiction. Ibis is
indicated by the fact that the State lax Commission Code of
Administrative Procedure in sections 1-1C13) and 8-1 still
refer to this, the Supreme Court, as the proper court of

appeal from Commission decisions.

Obviously the legislature

created the Tax Courts of the various judicial districts for
the purpose of relieving this the Utah Supreme Court of some
of its case burden by creating an interum forum for resolving
some of the issues. The District Courts have never had
appelate Jurisdiction of appeals from State Tax Commission
decisions, nor do they now have such jurisdiction.

Likewise,

the Tax Court has never had, nor does it now have general,
origional jurisdiction over all tax issues, but has
M

...exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions

for review of decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered
after formal hearings before the commission.".

Here is the

point of my argument: since the Tax Court is "exclusively" an
appelate court, it is barred, by the statute creating it,
from hearing instant case which comes as an origional action
commensed by the State Tax Commission, not an appeal from any
of their decisions!(record p. 46 11. 13-20)
This case therefore does not fall within the exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Tax Court and cannot be determined by it;
therefore, the contempt ruling and sanctions imposed are and
were

unlawful and ought to be reversed and dismissed

respectively.

UL
CPNqgsiqN

Reason, logic and common sence tells one that 'status'
is the first point to be considered when applying a code or
system of laws to a person. It mould be ridiculous to argue
that a civilian is subject to the military code; equally sos
it is ridiculous to assume that a nontaxpayer is subject to
UCA 59-14A, the Individual Income Tax Act. Absent proof that
a person is involved in a revenue taxable activity or event
which makes him a taxpayer, he cannot be assumed to be such
by the mere fact of his existence. Furthermore, a person
existing by exercising inalienable, constitutionally
guaranteed rights, is not a taxpayr because a state cannot
impose a charge or excise upon the enjoyment of a right.
Therefore, if the STC cannot produce evidence, beyond my
existence, that I am indeed a taxpayer subject to the revenue
code, they have no Jurisdiction to investigate me, to file
returns on my behalf, to claim deficiencies,

to assess fines

and penalties,to file warrants with the county, to subpoena
'witnesses* concerning me, nor to otherwise harass and
intimidate me. Lacking such Jurisdiction, any and all of the

above activities are null and void, being done under color of
law only.
Even if I were a taxpayer, the document purporting to be
a subpoena, and for which I was ruled in contempt, was
improperly issued and therefore of no force and effect. Three
errors on the part of the STC make the purported document
invalid as a subpoena, namely:
First, because it was not 'issued1 by the Commissioners
of the STC, but was concocted by a compliance agent with a
signature page taken from another document. UCA 59-5-46C17)
specifically gives subpoena power to the Commission, but does
not give it to anyone else, nor does it authorize the
Commission to delegate said power. Therefore a subpoena, such
as the one at issue here, which is not personally signed and
issued by the Commission (meaning the five Commissioners) is
invalid and therefore carries no authority.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Hinker 350 U.S. 173, has ruled that the term 'witness', as
used in statutes confering subpoena power to administrative
governmental agencies, does not include a putative defendent
such as I. The Justices voiced their concerns thusly:
"...compulsory exparte administrative examination,
untrammelled by the safeguards of a public
adversary Judicial proceeding, afford too ready
opportunity for unhappy consequences to
prospective defendants..."
Flinker. Supra at p. 188 (Addendum #1)

If I, as a prospective defendant cannot be included
within the scope of the meaning of the word 'witness' as used
in UCft 59~S-~46C17), then the STC has no authority to command
my appearance. Any purported subpoena served upon me pursuant
to such is nothing more than a piece of paper with an
expensive delivery price.
Thirdly,because the purported administrative subpoena
attempts to compel mo beyond the limits established for
properly issued Judicial subpoenas. URCP 45dCE) states that
except by court order specifying otherwise, a resident may be
required to attend an examination onlu in the countu wherein
jtlfi. resides or is employed or transacts business in person.
The purported supoena demanded that I appear in the private
offices of the STC in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County. Since
I neither reside, transect business in person, nor am
employed in Salt lake County, even a Judicial subpoena cannot
normally compel my appearance there, much less an
administrative subpoena!
Should the

facts and circumstances of this case be so

different that I were a taxpayer, and that the purported
subpoena were valid, the contempt ruling and the sanction
imposed would still be in error because the Tax Court of the
Third Judicial District lacks Jurisdiction to even consider
this case. The sole grant of authority to the Tax Courts is
found in UCft 59-24-1 which gave them Jurisdiction over
appeals from and petitions for review of decisions rendered

by the STC after formal hearings. Prior to the passage of
this act all such appeals and petitions for review were
brought directly to this Supreme Court. It is clear to all
who care to see that the Tax Court was created specifically
and exclusively as an interim appellate court to relieve this
court of some of its case load. If a case would not qualify
to be heard by this court before the passage of the Tax Court
Act, then it cannot be heard by the Tax Court now. The STC
would never consider bringing an origional action for
enforcement of an administrative subpoena to this Utah
Supreme Court; and yet they are attempting to use the
appellate Tax Court as their private enforcement arm,
bringing all their grievances as origional actions there. Let
me emphasize again that the Tax Court is an appealate court
for the use of the aarieved taxpayer. In the instant case
there is no agrieved taxpayer,and no appeal has been filed
(record p. 46 11. 15-25). Therefore the Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this case and any ruling it makes, or
sanctions it imposes are done under color of law only and are
not valid.
For the foregoing reasons, it is my contention that the
contempt of court ruling , and the sanction of thirty days
imprisonment imposed by the Tax Court Judge are in error, fly
prayer to this court is that the Judgement be reversed, the
remaining sanctions canceled, costs and fees be awarded me
for having to defend myself, and punatitive damages awarded .

«Jit
DATED this ^

'

*

day of At*§t»t, 19B6.

/

/.

I,

Clay K. Iverson
Appellant in Proper Person

^i/t^vf&V^
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tnand the case to the
elsewhere: "A st*a i>
for that purpose.
presumably manifesting" *
policy, properly makes demands on the
Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting.
judicial process." National City Bank
of New York v. Republic of China, 348
Whether or not § 3 of the Federal ArU S. 356, SGO, 75 S Ct. 423, 427.
bitration Act is applicable to this conSurely in the light of all that has hap- tract, the judgment of the Couit of Appened since 1910 in the general field of peals should be afthmed.
the law of arbitration, it is not for us to
assume that the Court of Appeals, if it
had that question for consideration,
could not have found that the law of Vermont today does not require disregard
of a provision
212

of a contract made in New
York, with a purposeful desire to have
the law of New York govern, to accomplish a result that today may be
deemed to be a general doctrine of the
law. Of course, if the Court of Appeals,
versed in the general juiisprudence of
Vermont and having among its members
a Vermont lawyer, should find that the
Vermont court would, despite the New
York incidents of the contract, apply
Vermont law and that it is the habit of
the Vermont court to adhere to its precedents and to leave changes to the legislature, it would not be for the federal court
to gainsay that policy. I am not suggesting what the Court of Appeals' answer to
these questions would be, still less what
it should be. I do maintain that the defendant does have the right to have the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on
that question and that it is not for us to
deny him tliat right.
I would remand the case to the Court
of Appeals for its determination of Vermont law on matters which the basis of
its decision heretofore rendered it needless to consider.
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court except insofar as it undertakes to review
and affirm the District Court's interpretation of Vermont law. I agree with Mr.
Justice FRANKFURTER that the review of questions of state law should
ordinarily be left to the Courts of Ap76 S.Ct —18Vi

Assuming the validity of the arbitration clause in the New York contract
here invohed, I regard the procedure
213

which it prescribes as a permissible
"form of trial." See Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 2 Cir., 146 F.2d
381. Accordingly, the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont may stay its own proceedings to
await completion of| the arbitration proceedings, although a state court of Vermont would not do likewise. I do not interpret Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 58 S.Ct 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, or Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 65 S Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, as
requiring the contrary.
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UNITED STATES of America,
Petitioner,
v.
Abraham MINKER.
Salvatore FALCONE and Joseph Falcone,
Petitioners,
v.
Harold E. BARNES, Officer in Charge of
immigration and Naturalization
Service.
Nos. 35, 47.
Argued Nov. 14, 15, 1955.
Decided Jan 16, 1956.
Two cases, in one of which the Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit, 217 F.2d 350,
held that a naturalized citizen subpoenaed as a "witness" in an investigation
maintained for purpose of determining
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whether denaturalization proceedings
should be instituted against him was a
putative defendant in such proceeding
and was not a "witness" within the statute conferring subpoena power upon immigration officers. In the other case the
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 219 F.
2d 137, in reversing a District Court decision, 116 F.Supp. 464, rendered a conflicting decision. The cases came to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
held that the naturalized citizens under
such circumstances were not "witnesses"
within the meaning of the statute.
Judgment of Third Circuit affirmed;
judgment of Second Circuit reversed.

350 U.S. 179

4. Statutes €=5211
The title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain
meaning.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
C=>303

Where administrative action may result in loss of both property and life, or
of all that makes life worth living, any
doubt as to extent of power delegated to
administrative officials is to be resolved
in citizen's favor, and court must be especially sensitive to citizen's rights
where proceeding is non-judicial. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101 et
seq., 235(a), 284, 340(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§
1101 et seq„ 1225(a), 1354, 1451(a).
6. Aliens C=>71(1)
Naturalized citizens who were each
the subject of denaturalization investigation were not "witnesses" within statute conferring power on immigration officers to subpoena "witnesses", where purpose of inquiry was to determine whether
good cause existed to institute denaturalization proceedings against such naturalized citizens. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101(a) (18), 235(a), 23G
(a), 242(b), 335, and (b), 336(d;, 340
(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a) (18), 1225
(a), 1226(a), 1252(b), 1446, and (b),
1447(d), 1451(a).

1. Courts e=>383(l)
Where Second and Third Circuits
divided on question whether statute empowers immigration officer to subpoena
a naturalized citizen to determine if good
cause exists for institution of denaturalization proceedings, Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Immigration and
Nationality Act, §§ 235(a), 340(a), 8 U.
S.C.A. §§ 1225(a), 1451(a).
2. Aliens e=>71(l)
Section of Immigration and Nationality Act conferring subpoena power on
any commissioner of immigration or inspector in charge strictly defines purSee publication Words and Phrases,
poses for which officers can subpoena
for other judicial constructions and defiwitnesses and does not confer power to
nitions of "Witnesses".
issue subpoenas as aids in investigating
potential naturalization offenses. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 235(a), 8 No. 35:
U.S.C.A. § 1225(a).
Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington,
3. Aliens e=>71(l)
D. C , for the United States.
Word "Act" as used in section of
ISO
Immigration and Nationality Act relatMr. Jacob Kossman, Philadelphia, Pa.,
ing to subpoenas, in clause "or concern- for respondent Minker.
ing any matter which is material and No. 47:
relevant to the enforcement of this Act
Mr. George Morris Fay, Washington,
and the administration of the Service,"
D. C, for Falcone.
refers not to title or section but to entire
Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington,
statute. Immigration and Nationality
D.
C, for respondent Barnes.
Act, §§ 215(g), 235(a), 241(a) (2), 290
Mr.
Justice FRANKFURTER deliv(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1185(g), 1225(a),
ered
the
opinion of the Court.
1251(a) (2), 1360(a).
[1] Because of conflicting construcSee publication Words and Phrases,
tions by the Courts of Appeals for the
for other judicial constructions and defiSecond and Third Circuits of § 235(a)
nitions of "Act".
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of the Immigration and Nationality Act privilege of any person to enter, reenter,
of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 1CJ$, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ reside in, or pass through the United
1101 et seq., 1225(a), we brought these States or concerning any matter which
cases here, 349 U.S. 904, 75 S Ct. 582; is material and relevant to the enforcer s U.S. 927, 75 S.Ct. 774. They were merit of this Act and the administration
heard in sequence, and, since minor dif- of the Service, and to that end may inferences in their facts are irrelevant to voke the aid of any court of the United
the problems now before us, they may be States." The controlling issue presented
by these cases is whether this section
disposed of in one opinion.
Section 235(a) 1 provides that any im- empowers an immigration officer to submigration officer "shall have power to re- poena a naturalized citizen who is the
subject of an investigation by the Servquire by subpena the attendance
ice, where the purpose of the investiga181
and tion is to determine if good cause exists
testimony of witnesses before immigra- for the institution of denaturalization
relating to the proceedings under § 340(a) of the Act.:
lion officers *
I. Section 235(a) in full provides: "The
inspection, other than the physical and
mental examination, of aliens (including
alien crewmen) seeking admission or readmission to or the privilege of passing
through the United States shall be eonducted by immigration officers, except as
otherwise provided in regard to special
inquiry officers. All aliens arriving at
ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney
General and under such regulations as he
may prescribe. Immigration officers are
hereby authorized and empowered to
board and search any vessel, aircraft,
railway car, or other conveyance, or vehicle in which they believe aliens are
being brought into the United States.
The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers, shall hn\o power to administer
*>aths and to take and consider evidence
of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or
suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter,
pass through, or reside in the United
States or concerning any matter which
is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and, where such
action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence. Any person coming into the United States may
be required to state under oath the purpose or purposes for which he comes, the
length of time he intends to remain in
the United States, whether or not he
intends to remain in the United States
permanently and, if an alien, whether he
intends to become a citizen thereof, and
«uch other items of information as will
aid the immigration officer in determining
whether he is a national of the United
States or on alien and, if the latter,

whether he belongs to any of the excluded classes enumerated in section 212.
The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers, shall have power to require by subpena the attendance and testimony of
witnesses before immigration officers and
special inquiry officers and the production
of books, papers, and documents relating to the privilege of any person to
enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through
the United States or concerning any matter which is materia) and relevant to
the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and to that
end may invoke the aid of any court of
the United States. Any United States
district court within the jurisdiction of
which investigations or inquiries are being conducted by an immigration officer
or special inquiry officer may, in the
event of neglect or refusal to respond to
a subpena issued under this subsection
or refusal to testily before an immigration officer or special inquiry officer, issue an order requiring such persons to
appear before an immigration officer or
special inquiry officer, produce books, papers, and documents if demanded, and
testify, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt thereof."
2. Section 340(a) provides. "It shall be
the duty of the United States district
attorneys for the respective districts,
upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court
specified in subsection (a) of section
o!0 of this title in the judicial district
in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the
purpose of revoking and setting aside the
order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of nat-
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doing and fined $500. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
holding that while the power to subpoena
under § 235(a) was available for investigations directed toward denaturalization
proceedings, respondent as a putative defendant in such a proceeding was not a
"witness" within the meaning of the
section, and the Service was, therefore,
183
without power to subpoena him.4 217
Minker's naturalization the Director F.2d 350.
subpoenaed him to give testimony at the
In No. 47, each petitioner was served
offices of the Service. Prior 'to the required date of his appearance, he moved with a subpoena issued by the officer in
to quash the subpoena in the United charge of the Immigration and NaturalStates District Court for the Eastern ization Service at Syracuse, New York.
District of Pennsylvania upon the The subpoenas commanded petitioners'
ground, inter alia, that it was unauthor- appearance and testimony, and required
ized by the Act This motion was denied, them to produce specified documents.
In re Minker, D.C., 118 F.Supp. 264, and They appeared with documents as orno appeal was taken. When respondent dered, but refused to be sworn or to testhereafter failed to obey the subpoena, tify. Thereupon an application for an
the District Court, on application of the order of compliance was made by the
^istrict Director, ordered respondent to Service in the United States District
spear before the Service and testify. Court for the Northern District of New
e disregarded this order. After a hear- York; but the court, den>ing the Servig he was adjudged in contempt for so ice's authority, refused to compel peti-

In No. 35, the District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
at Philadelphia, in accordance with §
340.11 of the Service's regulations, 3 instituted an investigation of respondent
for the aforementioned purpose. In furtherance of this inquiry into the legality
of

uralization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were
procured by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation, and
such revocation and setting aside of the
order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of
naturalization shall be effective as of the
original date of the order and certificate,
respectively: Provided, That refusal on
the part of a naturalized citizen within a
period often years following his naturalization to testify as a witness in any proceeding before a congressional committee
concerning his subversive activities, in a
case where such person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal, shall be
held to constitute a ground for revocation
of such person's naturalization under this
subsection as having been procured by
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. If the naturalized
citizen does not reside in any judicial district in the United States at the time of
bringing such suit, the proceeding may be
instituted in the United States Distuct
Court for the District of Columbia or iu
the United States district court in the
judicial district in which such person last
had his residence."

3. 8 CFK § 340.11 provides:
"Investigation
and report.
Whenever it appears that
any grant of naturalization may have
been procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, the facts shall be reported to the
district director having jurisdiction over
the naturalized person's last known place
of residence. If the district director is
satisfied that a prima facie showing has
been made that grounds for revocation
exist, he j-hall cause an investigation to
be made and report the facts in writing
to the Commissioner with a recommendation as to whether revocation proceedings should be instituttd. If it appears that n iturahzation was procured
in violation of section 1123 of Title 18 of
the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1425, the facts in regard thereto may
be presented bv the district director to
the appropriate United States Attorney for possible < nminal prosecution "
4. The question whether respondent was
required to obey the order of the District Com t inespeetive of that court's
power under § 235(a) has not been
raised. See United States v. United Mine
Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67
S.Ct. 077, 91 L.Ed. 884.
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tioners to appear and give testimony. § 16. But the word "alien? was changed
Application of Barnes, D.C., 116 F. to "person," and additional language exSupp. 464. On appeal, to the Court of tended the subpoena power to "any mat184
ter which is material and relevant to the
Appeals for the Second Circuit, this enforcement of this Act and the adminjudgment was reversed. 219 F.2d 137. istration of the Service." If the addiThe court held that § 235(a) of the Act tional clause, following thi portion "repermitted the immigration officer to sub- l a t i n g t o t h e privilege" of U y person to
poena the petitioners in furtherance of e n t e r < r e e n t e r , reside in, orl pass through
the Service's investigation of them un- the United States", had merely read
der § 340.11 of the regulations. The "and any other matter which is material
decision assumed, although the court and
185
did not discuss the question, that each
relevant/' the doctrinle of ejusdem
petitioner, even though a subject of investigation, was a "witness" within the generis would appropriately be invoked
to limit the subpoena power to an inmeaning of § 235(a). 6
vestigation pertaining to questions of
[2] This brings us to an examination admission and deportation. The comof the scope of § 235(a). It had its gen- prehensive addition of the clause "or
esis in § 16 of the Immigration Act of concerning any matter w h i p is material
1917, 39 Stat. 874, 885, which dealt with and relevant to the enforcement of this
the examination of entering aliens by Act and the administration of the Servthe Immigration Service. With respect ice*', precludes such narrowing reading.
to subpoenas the section provided: "Any "Act" encompasses the full range of
commissioner of immigration or inspec- subjects covered by the itatute. The
tor in charge shall also have power to re- Immigration and Nationality Act of
Quire by subpoena the attendance and 1952 brought together in one statute the
testimony of witnesses before said in- previously atomized subjects of immispectors and the production of books, gration, nationality and daturalization.
papers, and documents touching the The unqualified use of thi word "Act"
right of any alien to enter, reenter, re- in § 235(a), if read as ordinary English,
aide in, or pass through the United embraces all of these subjects even
States, and to that end may invoke the though § 235(a) is itself in the immiaid of any court of the United States gration title of the statutle. But "the
* * # >» Obviously, this provision title of a statute and the sheading of a
strictly defined the purposes for which section cannot limit the plain meaning
^ c e r s of the Service could subpoena •
* # » Brotherhood | of Railroad
witnesses. It did not give them power Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co,,
to issue subpoenas as aids in investigat- 331 U.S. 519, 528-529, 67 S.Ct. 1387,
lr
*g potential naturalization offenses.
1391-1392, 91 L.Ed. 1G46. Throughout
this statute the word "Actr is given its
13,4] The 1952 Act in § 235(a) re- full significance. The weird embraces
tained the substance of this language in the entire statute. 6 On the other hand,
5

Fifth
Lan-

S

E. g., § 215(g) : "Passports, visas, reentry permits, and other documents required for entry under this Act may be
considered as permits to enter for the
purposes of this section/' Section 211
(**) (2) : "Any alien in the United
States * * * shall, upon the order
°f the Attorney General, be dt ported
who—* * • entered the United States

- The Court of Appeals for the
Circuit has taken the same vi< w.
feiy v. Savoretti, 220 F.2d 000.

without inspection or at riny time or
place other than as design luted by the
Attorney General or is m the United
States in \iolation of this Al ct or m violation of any oih*r law of| the United
State* '
Section 290 fi) : I'Trero shall
be established in the office of |the Commissinner, for the use of the sec irity and enfureement agencies of the Go|vcrnment of
the United States, a central |n<lex, which
bhali contain the names of all aliens heretofure admitted to the Unitejd States, or
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when
186

only a particular title is referred
'ed
en
to, it is designated as such, and when
>r(i
the reference is to a section, that word
irs
is employed.7 No justification appears
m
for treating "Act" in § 235(a) as mean~
nd
ing "section," Thus far the Second and
Third Circuits are in agreement.
on
[5, 6] We come then to the question
a]s
upon which the two Courts of Appeals
»35
part ways in their construction of § 235
r0„
(a), namely, whether Salvatore and Jora.
seph Falcone in the one case and Abrach
ham Minker in the other, although each
es_
the subject of a denaturalization invesIa„
tigation under § 340.11 of the regulahe
tions, were "witnesses" within the
inmeaning of the power given to "any imDe_
migration officer" to require "by subpoeitna the attendance and testimony of witnesses" before immigration officers.

If the answer to the question merely
*[y
depended upon whether, as a matter ,°
of
allowable English usage, the word "wit\"
ness" may fairly describe a person min
es
the position of Minker and the Falcones,
'
>r
it could not be denied that the word
could as readily be deemed to cover
^
persons in their position as not. Inn
short, the word is patently ambiguous:
|j**
it can fairly be applied to anyone who0
gives testimony in a proceeding, although the proceeding immediately or
potentially involves him as a party, orr
°
it may be restricted to the person who0
gives testimony in another's case.

350 U . S . 185

type of investigation in which a subpoena may be issued ("any matter which
is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act"), but also with respect
to the member of the Service empowered
to issue it. The power is granted "any
immigration officer," who in turn is defined in § 101(a) (18) of the Act as
"any employee or class of employees of
the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform the
functions of an immigration officer specified by this Act or any section thereof." This extensive delegated authority
reinforces the considerations inherent in
the nature of the power sought to be exercised that make for a restrictive read* n £ °^ tt*e Janus-faced word "witness."
The subpoena power "is a power capable
°* oppressive use, especially when it may
be indiscriminately delegated and the
subpoena is not returnable before a judicial officer. * * * True, there can
be no penalty incurred for contempt before there is a judicial order of enforcement. But the subpoena is in foim an
official command, and even though improvidently issued it has some coercive
tendency, either because of ignorance of
their rights on the part of those whom
it purports to command or their natural
respect for what appears to be an official
command, or because of their reluctance
to test the subpoena's validity by litigation," Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 3(33-364, 62 S.Ct. 651,
654 655, 86 L.Ed. 895.

187

These concerns, relevant to the conIt is pertinent to note the breadth of
lie struction of this ambiguously worded
§ 235(a) not only with respect to the
excluded therefrom, insofar as such information is available from the existing
records of the Service, and the names of
all aliens hereafter admitted to the United States, or excluded therefrom, the
names of their sponsors of record, if any,
and such other relevant information as
the Attorney General tdinll require as an
aid to the proper enforcement of t<his
Act."
7. E. g., § 284: "Nothing contained in
this title shall be construed so as to
limit, rest! ict, deny, or affect the coming into or departure from the United

States of an alien member of the Arm^d
Forces of the United States who is in
the uniform of, or who bears documents
identifying him as a member of, such
Armed Forces, and who is coming to or
departing from the I nited States under
oifici.il orders or permit of such Armed
F o r c e s : ProvnUd,
That nothing contained in this section shall be construed
to give to or confer upon any such alien
any other privileges, rights, benefits, exemptions, or immunities under this Act,
which are not otherwise specifically
granted by this Act."
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power, are emphatically pertinent to investigations that constitute the first step
in proceedings calculated to bring about
the denaturalization of citizens. See
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L,Ed. 1796; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525. This may
result in "loss of both property and
life, or of all that makes life worth living/' Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276,
188

284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938.
In such a situation where there is doubt
it must be resolved in the citizen's favor. Especially must we be sensitive to
the citizen's rights where the proceeding is nonjudicial because of "[t]he
difference in security of judicial over
administrative action # * V
Ng
Fung Ho v. White, supra, 259 U.S. at
page 285, 42 S.Ct. at page 495.
These considerations of policy, which
determined the Court's decisions in requiring judicial as against administrative adjudication of the issue of citizenship in a deportation proceeding and
those defining the heavy criterion of
proof to be exacted by the lower courts
from the Government before decreeing
denaturalization, are important guides
in reaching decision here. They give
coherence to law and are fairly to be
assumed as congressional presuppositions, unless by appropriate explicitness
the lawmakers make them inapplicable.
Cf. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81,
83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622. It does not bespeak depreciation of official zeal, nor
^oes it bring into question disinterestedness, to conclude that compulsory ex
+zrte administrative examinations, untrammelled by the safeguards of a pub^e adversary judicial proceeding, afford
to
<> ready opportunities for unhappy
•
8

- "While the Nationality Act [§ 333(a)
°f the 1940 Act] provides for subpena of
witnesses at a preliminary [naturalization] hearing and for calling of witnesses
*a any naturalization proceedings in
court, specific provision is not made for
•unpenning the petitioner. The subcommittee feels that the proposed bill should

consequences to prospective defendants
in denaturalization suits.
These general considerations find specific reinforcement in the language of
other provisions of the Act, wherein the
person who is the subject of an investigation is referred to with particularity.
The most striking example of this is to
be found in § 335 and its legislative history which pertains to the investigation
of an alien who petitions for naturalization. Section 335(b) provides: "The
Attorney General shall designate employees of the Service to conduct preliminary examinations upon petitions
for naturalization * * *. For such
purposes any such employee so designated is hereby authorized to take testimony concerning any matter touching
or in any way affecting the admissibility
of any petitioner for naturalization,
189

to
administer oaths, including the oaths of
the petitioner for naturalization and the
oaths of petitioner's witnesses to the
petition for naturalization, and to require by subpena the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, including petitioner * * *." Contrast this with
§ 335(b)'s predecessor, § 333(a) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137,
1156: "* # # any such designated
examiner is hereby authorized to take
testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization, to subpena witnesses, and to administer oaths, including the oath of the
petitioner to the petition for naturalization and the oath of petitioner's witnesses/' 8 Other examples of Congress' careful differentiation between a witness
who is not the subject of an investigation and the person who is, may be
found in §§ 236(a), 9 242(b) 10 and 336
contain the requirement that the petitioner be required to attend hearings and
is so recommending." S.Iiep. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 739.
9. Section 236(a) provides: "A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings
10. See note 10 on page 288.
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( d ^ o f the 1952 Act.
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All these considerations converge to
the conclusion that Congress has not
provided with sufficient clarity that the
subpoena power granted by § 235(a) extends over persons who are the subject
of
denaturalization
investigations;
therefore Congress is not to be deemed
to have done so impliedly. Since this is
so, we are not called "upon to consider
whether Congress may empower an immigration officer to secure evidence, under the authority of a subpoena, from a
citizen who is himself the subject of an
investigation directed toward his denaturalization. The judgment in No. 35 is
affirmed; in No. 47, the judgment is
reversed.
Affirmed and reversed respectively.
Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring.
The respondent Minker is a naturalized citizen of the United States. 1 He
was subpoenaed by an immigration officer to appear and give testimony as a
"witness." But Minker was not to be
a witness within the traditional meaning
of that word, that is, one who testifies
in a court proceeding or in a public
quasi-judicial hearing of some kind. The
immigration officer summoning Minker
under this section, administer oaths,
present and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the
alien or witnesses."
10. Section 242(b) provides: "A special
inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings
under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and crossexamine the alien or witnesses, and, as
authorized by the Attorney General, shall
make determinations, including orders of
deportation."
11. Section 836(d) provides: ' T h e Attorney General shall have the right tb appear before any court in any naturalization proceedings for the purpose of
cross-examining the petitioner and the
witnesses produced in support of the petition concerning any matter touching or
in any way affecting the petitioner's right

350 U.S. 189

was not a judge or "grand jury" of any
kind, nor was he at the time acting in
any quasi-judicial capacity. Cf. In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.
Ed. 682. He was acting under his broad
power as a law enforcement officer to
follow up clues and find information that
might be useful in later civil or criminal
prosecutions brought against persons
suspected
191

of violating the immigration
and naturalization laws. See, e. g., §
287, Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1357; 8 CFR §§ 287.1-287.5. The
object in summoning Minker was to interrogate him in the immigration officer's private chambers to try to elicit
information "relating to the possible institution of proceedings seeking the revocation of * # # [Minker's] naturalization. # * *" Information so obtained might be used under some circumstances in court to take away Milker's American citizenship or convict
him of perjury or some other crime.2
Thus the capacity in which this immigration officer was acting was precisely
the same as that of a policeman, constable, sheriff, or Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who interrogates a
person, perhaps himself a suspect, in
connection with murder or some other
to admission to citizenship, and shall
have the right to call witnesses, including the petitioner, produce evidence, and
be heard in opposition to, or in favor
of, the granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings."
1. Minker is respondent in No. 35. He
and the petitioners in No. 47, Salvatore
and Joseph Falcone, raise the same questions, and what 1 say about Minker's case
applies also to that of the Fulcoues.
2. See § 348, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1459,
8 U.S.C.A. § 1450; 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1621. See also Gonzales v.
Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 2.10, reversing 9 Cir., 215 F.2d 955. But see
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6
S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; majority and
dissenting opinions in Feidman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 88
L.Ed. 1408; Adams v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442, 98 L.Bd. 608.
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crime. Apparently Congress has never
even attempted to vest FBI agents with
such private inquisitorial power. Indeed, this Court has construed congressional enactments as designed to safeguard persons against compulsory questioning by law enforcement officers behind closed doors. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.
Ed. 819; Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100.
And we have frequently set aside state
criminal convictions as a denial of due
process of law because of coercive questioning of suspects by public prosecutors
and other law enforcement officers in
their official chambers. See, e. g., Watts
v, Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct, 1347,
93 LEd. 1801; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct, 1354, 93 L.Ed.
1815; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 60 S.Ct 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. Yet
power of the Attorney General and immigration officers to compel persons, including suspects, to appear and subject
themselves
193

tion matters. For this reason I concur
in the Court's judgment in £his case.
The Department of Justice finds the
sweeping power it claims in § 235 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 66 Stat. 163, 198, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101,
1225, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1225. That
Act is a comprehensive codification of
laws relating to entry, exclusion, domestic control, deportation and naturalization of aliens; the Act also provides the
controlling rules and procedures for denaturalizing naturalized citizens. Primary responsibility for administration
and enforcement of the Act is vested in
the Attorney General, acting chiefly
through his subordinates in the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8
103, 66 S t a t 173, 8 U.S.C. § 1103, 8 U.S.
C.A. § 1103.
This Court has drawn sharp and highly important distinctions between the
constitutional power of Congress to bar
and exclude aliens and congressional
power to strip
193

citizens of their citizento questioning by law enship.
Former
cases
have held that Conforcement officers in their private chambers is precisely what the Department of gress has full power to bar or exclude
Justice claims here. This is no less true aliens from the country. See, e. g., Unitbecause a federal judge must be called ed States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25
°n to "aid" the immigration officer in S.Ct 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040; Harisiades v,
subjecting a summoned person to ques- Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512,
tioning. § 235(a), 66 S t a t 198, 8 U.S. 96 L.Ed. 586; Shaughnessy v. United
c
- § 1225(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a). For States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.
a
fter a court order, as before, the per- Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956. But citizenship,
son summoned must go to an immigra- whether acquired by birth or by naturaltion officer's private chambers for ques- ization, cannot be taken away without a
tioning by him, out of which may come judicial trial in which the Government
a
Prosecution against the "witness" for carries a heavy burden. Se£, e. g., Ng
Perjury or some other crime. A purpose Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.
to
subject aliens, much less citizens, to Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938; Baumgartner v.
a
Police practice so dangerous to indi- United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct.
ytoual liberty as this should not be read 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525; Gonzales v. Lanmto an Act of Congress in the absence don, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210. Con°* a clear and unequivocal congressional gress, apparently taking note of these
j&andate. I think the Act relied on here * basic distinctions, divided tt\e Act into
oy the Department of Justice should not different "Titles" and "Chapters." Sece
so read, I would hold that immigra- tion 235, on which the Government re*on officers are wholly without statu- lies here, appears in Chapter IV of Title
r f
> authority to summon persons, II. Title II as a whole contains provi'ether suspects or not, to testify in sions relating to "Immigration" and
vate as
"witnesses" in denaturaliza- Chapter IV of that Title contains the
W S.Ct.—1»
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"Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion/' It is in the context of Chapter IV that § 235 gives the Attorney
General and immigration officers, "including special inquiry officers", broad
power to subpoena and require testimony of "witnesses" as to "the privilege
of any person to enter, reenter, reside
in, or pass through the United States or
concerning any matter which is material
and relevant to the enforcement of this
Act and the administration of the Service * * *." I think that context indicates that § 235 was designed to apply
only to the examination of "witnesses"
by immigration officers in relation to
"entry and exclusion" of aliens, and
matters material and relevant to entry
and exclusion. Such a reading makes
the subpoena power given fit into the
carefully devised pattern of Title II,
which deals with aliens and immigration, not with naturalization or denaturalization. Even if limited to matters
pertaining to the entry and exclusion
of aliens, compulsory private examination of "witnesses" might be invalid.
The broad powers here claimed by the

"Nationality and Naturalization." That
Title provides procedures for investigation and trial of naturalization and denaturalization cases, wholly adequate in
themselves without reliance on the subpoena and examination powers of immigration officers under § 235. The naturalization and denaturalization procedures of Title III are not merely adequate, but are in a measure inconsistent
with § 235 procedure. Looking first at
naturalization procedure under §§ 332336, 66 Stat. 252-258, 8 U.S.C. §§ 14431447, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1443-1447, it appears that Congress with meticulous
care provided a procedure for investigation of naturalization cases. These sections provide their own way for summoning and examining witnesses, Without mentioning immigration officers, the
sections provide for investigations, etc.,
to be carried on by any employee of the
Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General. An examination under this Title is carried on by
a public hearing at which an applicant
for citizenship can produce his own witnesses. 3 The designated

194

195

Attorney General and his immigration
officers could be more nearly defended,
if they can be defended at all, by confining use of the powers to the field of
treatment of aliens, where this Court
has said Congress has most power.

hearing examiner is given the power to subpoena witnesses by § 335(b), 66 Stat. 255, 8 U.S.
C. § 1446(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b), and
the naturalization judge is authorized
to compel compliance with the subpoena.
After the hearing the examiner reports
his findings and recommendations to the
Attorney General. The views of the
designated examiner, and of the Attorney General if in conflict, are then reported to the naturalization court for its

Limitation of the subpoena and investigatory powers in § 235 to matters relating to entry, control and exclusion of
aliens is strengthened by consideration
of Title III of the Act which covers
3. The Attorney General's regulations for
the conduct of these examinations, 8
CFIi §§ 335.11~S35.1S, also provide that
the petitioner for naturalization may be
represented by counsel and that the petitioner may cross-examine government
witnesses. If petitioner is not represented by counsel, the hearing examiner
must assist him in introducing his evi- '
dence. Furthermore the decision of the
examiner may not be based on evidence
which is not in the record or which
would be inadmissible in judicial proceedings. Thus the regulations emphasize

the difference between a subpoena to testify before a § 335 naturalization hearing officer and a subpoena to testify before a § 235 immigration officer seeking
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution or deportation. And they show that
naturalization procedures are completely
independent from entry and exclusion
procedures. Cf. §§ 235(c), 230(a), 202,
66 Stat. 199, 200, 235, 8 U.S.C §§ 1225
(c), 1220(a), 1362, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225
(c), 1226(a), 1362; 8 CFR §§ 235.15,
236.11-236.16.
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consideration. All of this persuades
me that reliance on the subpoena and
private examination powers of immigration officers under § 235 would actually
conflict with the public hearing procedure Congress and the Attorney General have provided for naturalization
cases in §§ 332-335, 66 Stat. 252-257,
8 US.C. §§ 1443-1446, 8 US.C.A. §§
1443-1446, and 8 CFR §§ 335 11-335.13.
It seems even clearer that immigration officers' powers under § 235 are not
applicable in denaturalization cases. Section 340 of Title III of the Act, 66 Stat.
260, 8 U.S.C. § 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451,
provides for revocation of naturalization. Responsibility for initiating such
cases is placed on district attorneys "upon affidavit showing good cause therefor * * •." Many of the grounds for
denaturalization are aba grounds for
felony prosecutions. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that
Congress expressly placed responsibility
for instituting denaturalization proceedings on district attorneys, leaving them
to summon persons to appear as witnesses in the traditional manner before
grand juries or courts. It would have
been surprising had Congress attempted
to authorize the Nation's chief prosecuting officer and his subordinates to compel a citizen to appear in go\ernment
private offices to
196

Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401. Congress has
provided a special judicial procedure
which must be followed, if a citizen is
denaturalized. That procedure is contained in § 340 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 163,
8 IKSC. § 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451. It
provides for canceling a certificate of
naturalization on the ground that it was
procured "by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation."
§ 340(a). Suit may be brought by the
United States Attorney in the District
Court "upon affidavit showing good
cause." Id. The citizen whose citizenship is challenged has 60 days "in wiiieh
to make answers to the petition of the
United States." § 340(b). There is no
pretrial administrative procedure provided in the section governing denaturalization. One can search § 340 in vain
for any suggestion that the judicial procedure is supplemented by a pretrial
procedure. So to hold would make the
60-day period for answer "empty
words," as Judge Foley ruled in Application of Barnes, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 464,
469, As Judge Hastie, writing for the
court below m the Minker case, said,
the administrative pretrial procedure is
not consistent with the safeguards
which Congress has provided in the judicial proceedings. 3 Cir., 217 F.2d 350,
352. I agree with that view and would,
therefore, read

297
answer questions in
§ 235(a) to exclude witsecret about that citizen's conduct, associations and beliefs. Some countries nesses who are potential defendants in
,
£ive such powers to their officials. It § 340 cases.
is to be hoped that this country never
Ther^ is another reason for reading
will.
the section narrowly. When we deal
with citizenship wre tread on sensitive
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. ground. The citizenship of a naturalized
While I agree with the result reached person has the same dignity and status
by the Court, I do not think this case as the citizenship of those of us born
*s comparable to those controversies that here, save only for eligibility to the
frequently rage over the scope of the Presidency. Pie is a member of a com^vestigative power in support of ad- munity included within the protection
ministrative action, Cf. Cudahy Pack- of all the guarantees of the Constitution.
l
n Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S. Those safeguards would be imperiled if
Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed 895 with United States prior to the institution of the proceedv
- Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S. ings the citizen could be compelled to be
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a witness against himself and furnish
out of his own mouth the evidence used
to denaturalize him. I would require
the Government to proceed with meticulous regard for the basic notions of Due
Process which protect every vital right
of the American citizen.

O ! IVf NtfMtf I SYSTfM>

350 TT.S. 214

Dantan George REA, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America,
No. 30.
Argued Nov. 10, 1955.
Decided Jan. 16, 1956.

350 U.S. 197

2. Courts 0^383(1)

Certiorari was granted to review refusal to enjoin federal narcotics agent
from testifying in state criminal prosecution with respect to narcotics obtained
in illegal search, because of the importance in federal law eniorcement of the
question presented.
3. Courts C=>383(1)
Question whether a federal agent
who had obtained narcotics under an allegedly invalid search warrant should be
enjoined by a federal court from testifying in a state court prosecution concerning the evidence seized did not raise
a constitutional question, but one concerning the Supreme Court's supervisory
powers over federal law enforcement
agencies.

4. Searches and Seizures C^3(l)
The power of federal courts extends
to policing Federal Rules governing
Proceeding to enjoin federal narcot- searches and seizures, and making cerics agent from testifying in state court tain that they are observed.
prosecution with respect to narcotics
which were obtained by agent in course 5. Courts <&=>257
Federal courts sit to enforce federal
of illegal search and wiiich were suplaw,
including the process issuing irom
pressed in federal prosecution.
The
those
courts.
United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied relief 6. Criminal Law C=>394
sought, and movant appealed. The UnitA federal agent, in obtaining evied States Court of Appeals for the dence for federal prosecution, is obliged
Tenth Circuit, 218 F.2d 237, affirmed to obey the Federal Rules relating to
the order, and movant obtained certiora- searches and seizures. Fed.Rules Crim.
ri. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Proc. rule 41 (a, c), 18 U.S.C.A.
Douglas, held that agent was subject
7. C o u r t s <S==>262.6(5)
to injunction.
Where federal narcotics agent obReversed.
tained evidence, for federal prosecution,
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice in course of illegal search and seizure,
Reed, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice and evidence was suppressed in federal
Minton dissented.
court, federal agent was subject to injunction to prevent him from testifying
concerning the evidence in a state court
]L Criminal Law $=»1221
Evidence which was received to sup- prosecution. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc, rule
port charge of unlawful acquisition of 41(a, c, e), 18 U.S.C.A.; 26 U.S.C.A.
marihuana in violation of Internal Rev- (LR.C.1939) §§ 2593(a), 2598; 28 U.S.
enue Code was "contraband", and not re- C.A. § 2463; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4.
pleviable. 26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1939) §§
2593(a), 2598,
Mr. Joseph A. Sommer, for petitioner.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Contraband".

Mrs. Beatrice Rosenberg, Washington, D. C, for respondent.

